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• Regulatory capital standards based on internal 
credit risk models would allow banks and 
supervisors to take advantage of the benefits
of advanced risk-modeling techniques in 
setting capital standards for credit risk.
• The internal-model (IM) capital standards for 
market risk provide a useful prototype for IM 
capital standards in the credit risk setting.
• Nevertheless, in devising IM capital standards 
specific to credit risk, banks and supervisors 
face significant challenges. These challenges 
involve the further technical development of 
credit risk models, the collection of better data 
for model calibration, and the refinement of 
validation techniques for assessing model 
accuracy.
• Continued discussion among supervisors, 
financial institutions, research economists, 
and others will be key in addressing the 
conceptual and theoretical issues posed by 
the creation of a workable regulatory capital 
system based on banks’ internal credit risk 
models.
Using Credit Risk Models 
for Regulatory Capital: 
Issues and Options
n January 1996, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision adopted a new set of capital requirements to 
cover the market risk exposures arising from banks’ trading 
activities. These capital requirements were notable because, for 
the first time, regulatory minimum capital requirements could 
be based on the output of banks’ internal risk measurement 
models. The market risk capital requirements thus stood in 
sharp contrast to previous regulatory capital regimes, which 
were based on broad, uniform regulatory measures of risk 
exposure. Both supervisors and the banking industry 
supported the internal-models-based (IM) market risk capital 
requirement because firm-specific risk estimates seemed likely 
to lead to capital charges that would more accurately reflect 
banks’ true risk exposures.
That market risk was the first—and so far, only—
application of an IM regulatory capital regime is not surprising, 
given the relatively advanced state of market risk modeling at 
the time that the regulations were developed. As of the mid-
1990s, banks and other financial institutions had devoted 
considerable resources to developing “value-at-risk” models to 
measure the potential losses in their trading portfolios. 
Modeling efforts for other forms of risk were considerably less 
advanced. Since that time, however, financial institutions have 
made strides in developing statistical models for other sources 
of risk, most notably credit risk. Individual banks have 
developed proprietary models to capture potential credit-
related losses from their loan portfolios, and a variety of models 
are available from consultants and other vendors.
Beverly J. Hirtle, Mark Levonian, Marc Saidenberg, Stefan Walter, and David Wright
Beverly J. Hirtle is a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Mark 
Levonian is a director in the Banking Supervision and Regulation Division at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Marc Saidenberg is a Bank Supervision 
officer and Stefan Walter a vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
and David Wright is an assistant director of the Banking Supervision and 
Regulation Division at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
The authors would like to thank Edward Ettin, Michael Gordy, Darryll Hendricks, 
David Jones, Jose Lopez, Brian Peters, and two anonymous referees for many 
thoughtful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, or the Federal Reserve System. 
I20 Using Credit Risk Models for Regulatory Capital
These developments raise the question of whether banks’ 
internal credit risk models could also be used as the basis of 
regulatory minimum capital requirements. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision is in the midst of revising 
regulatory capital standards and has in fact considered using 
credit risk models for this purpose. However, in a study 
released in April 1999 (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 1999a), the Committee concluded that it was 
premature to consider the use of credit risk models for 
regulatory capital, primarily because of difficulties in 
calibrating and validating these models.
The purpose of this article is to build on this earlier work, by 
the Basel Committee and others, and to consider the issues that 
would have to be addressed in developing a regulatory minimum 
capital standard based on banks’ internal credit risk models. In 
conducting this exercise, we consider how such a capital regime 
might be structured if the models were sufficiently advanced. 
This article is not intended to be a policy proposal, but rather to 
serve as a discussion laying out the issues that would have to be 
addressed in creating a capital framework based on credit risk 
models. In particular, we draw on the structure of the IM capital 
charge for market risk and examine how this structure might be 
applied in the credit risk setting.
As in the market risk setting, the overall objective of an 
internal-models regulatory capital charge would be to allow 
banks and supervisors to take advantage of the benefits of 
advanced risk-modeling techniques in setting capital 
standards for credit risk. Ideally, the framework should 
provide supervisors with confidence that the IM capital 
charges are conceptually sound, empirically valid, and 
reasonably comparable across institutions. At the same time, 
an IM framework should be flexible enough to 
accommodate—and perhaps even encourage—further 
innovation in credit risk measurement. The balance between 
meeting immediate prudential needs and fostering 
continuing, fruitful innovation is one of the key themes in 
the discussion that follows.
The remainder of this article lays out the issues that would be 
involved in structuring an IM capital regime for credit risk 
exposures. The next section contains a brief overview of the basic 
concepts underlying credit risk models. We then describe the 
basic components of an IM capital framework for credit risk—
prudential standards, modeling standards, and validation 
techniques—and discuss a range of alternative approaches for 
these standards. At certain points in this discussion, we identify 
particularly difficult issues that would have to be addressed 
before an IM framework could be implemented. In such cases, 
we describe the scope of the issues and their importance, rather 
than make specific recommendations.
Overview of Credit Risk Models
This section provides a brief overview of credit risk models.1 
The purpose of this discussion is to provide background about 
the general structure and key features of credit risk models that 
will help explain the regulatory capital framework described in 
the next section. For this purpose, we will focus on the concepts 
that are common to all credit risk models, rather than present 
a detailed description of specific models. It is also important to 
note that the models described in this section are those that are 
usually applied to banks’ wholesale and middle-market 
commercial lending portfolios. The models used for some 
other types of credits—for example, retail lending such as 
credit cards, auto loans, and small business loans—generally 
differ from the models described below.
In very general terms, the purpose of a credit risk model is 
to estimate the probability distribution of future credit losses 
on a bank’s portfolio. The first step in constructing a credit risk 
model is therefore to define the concept of loss that the model 
is intended to capture, as well as the horizon over which the loss 
is measured. In terms of the definition of loss, models generally 
fall into one of two categories: models that measure the losses 
arising solely from defaults (“default mode” models), and 
models that incorporate gains and losses arising from less 
extreme changes in credit quality as well as from defaults 
(“multistate” or “mark-to-market” models). Clearly, the 
default mode paradigm is a restricted version of the multistate 
approach, and some models are designed to produce loss 
estimates based on both definitions of loss.
For both approaches, losses are measured over some future 
planning horizon. The most common planning horizon used is 
one year, meaning that the model will estimate changes in 
portfolio value—either from defaults or from more general 
changes in credit quality—between the current date and one 
year in the future. While a one-year horizon is most common 
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in practice, other choices are also possible, including fixed 
horizons other than one year and horizons that match the 
lifetime of the credits in the portfolio.
Once the definition of loss and the planning horizon have been 
selected, the model generates a distribution—a probability density 
function (PDF)—of future losses that can be used to calculate the 
losses associated with any given percentile of the distribution. In 
practice, banks concentrate on two such loss figures: expected 
loss and unexpected loss. Expected loss is the mean of the loss 
distribution and represents the amount that a bank expects to lose 
on average on its credit portfolio. Unexpected loss, in contrast, is a 
measure of the variability in credit losses, or the credit risk inherent 
in the portfolio. Unexpected loss is computed as the losses 
associated with some high percentile of the loss distribution (for 
example, the 99.9th percentile) minus expected loss. A high 
percentile of the distribution is chosen so that the resulting risk 
estimates will cover all but the most extreme events.
The first step in generating the PDF of future credit losses is 
to classify the individual credits in the portfolio by their current 
credit quality. Most frequently, this is done by distributing the 
credits across the bank’s internal credit risk rating system, 
which provides a picture of the current state of the credit 
portfolio. Typically, a bank will have an internal rating system 
that assigns each credit to one of a series of risk categories 
according to the borrower’s probability of default. The next 
conceptual step is to assess the probability that the positions 
might migrate to different risk categories—sometimes called 
“credit quality states”—during the planning horizon. In a 
default mode model, this process amounts to assessing the 
probability of default, while in a multistate model, it also 
incorporates assessing transition probabilities between internal 
rating categories. The accuracy of both the assignment and the 
quantification of banks’ internal risk ratings is critical, as these 
ratings and transition probabilities have a very significant effect 
on the estimation of portfolio credit risk.2
The third step in constructing a credit risk model is to estimate 
the likely exposure of each credit across the range of credit quality 
states. For whole loans, exposure is simply the face value of the 
loan and is usually constant across risk categories, but for other 
positions—such as lines of credit or derivatives—exposure can 
vary over time and might be correlated with the particular credit 
quality state. Finally, given the risk category and the exposure in 
that category, the last element to be determined is the valuation of 
the position. For default mode models, this valuation is usually 
accomplished by specifying a loss-given-default (LGD) 
percentage. This is, essentially, the proportion of the credit’s 
exposure that would be lost if the borrower defaults.3 For 
multistate models, this process generally involves revaluing the 
position using credit spreads that reflect the default risk associated 
with the particular rating category.
Thus far, the discussion has focused on the treatment of 
individual positions in a bank’s credit portfolio. Generating the 
PDF of future credit losses requires bringing these individual 
positions together to capture the behavior of the overall 
portfolio. From standard portfolio theory, this process 
essentially requires capturing the correlations between losses 
associated with individual borrowers. Correlations are vital in 
assessing risk at the portfolio level since they capture the 
interaction of losses on individual credits. In general, portfolio 
risk will be greater the more the individual credits in the 
portfolio tend to vary in common. In practice, incorporating 
correlations into a credit risk model involves capturing 
variances in and correlations between the risk category 
transition probabilities, credit exposures, and credit valuations.
Nearly all models assume that these variances and 
correlations are driven by one or more “risk factors” that 
represent various influences on the credit quality of the 
borrower (for example, industry, geographic region, or the 
general state of the economy). In some models, risk factors are 
economic variables such as interest rates and economic activity 
indicators, while other models derive default and transition 
probabilities from equity price data. In still other models, the 
risk factors are abstract factors that intuitively relate to business 
cycle conditions but are not tied to specific economic variables. 
In every case, the assumptions about the statistical process 
driving these risk factors determine the overall mathematical 
structure of the model and the shape of the PDF.4 Thus, 
assumptions about the distribution of risk factors are a key 
element in the design of all credit risk models.
Depending on the assumptions about the mathematical 
processes driving the risk factors, there are a variety of ways 
that the final PDF of future credit losses can be generated. In 
some cases, a specific functional form for the PDF is assumed 
and the empirical results are calculated analytically. In other 
cases, Monte Carlo simulation—generally involving 
simulation of the underlying risk factors that determine default 
and transition probabilities—is used to provide a numerical 
PDF. In either case, the final result is a PDF that can be used to 
derive estimates of the various percentiles of the loss 
distribution.
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Framework for an Internal-Models 
Capital Charge
This section describes a possible framework for an internal-
models regulatory capital charge for credit risk exposures. In 
developing this framework, we use the IM capital requirements 
for market risk as a model.5 As a practical matter, the market 
risk standards provide a foundation that would be familiar to 
the many parties involved in developing and implementing any 
new credit risk standards. On a theoretical level, it also seems 
reasonable to use the market risk framework as a starting point 
because, fundamentally, both market and credit risk models 
have the same goal: to estimate the distribution of gains and 
losses on a bank’s portfolio over some future horizon. The two 
types of models differ with respect to the underlying risk factors 
that generate these gains and losses, and these differences lead 
to significant differences in methodologies, modeling 
assumptions, and data requirements between the models. 
Nonetheless, the core similarity between the two types of 
models suggests that the framework used in the market risk 
setting can provide a workable beginning for a regulatory 
capital regime based on internal credit risk models.
As noted above, the basis of the market risk requirements is 
a risk measurement model that estimates the distribution of 
gains and losses on the bank’s portfolio over some future time 
horizon. The market risk capital charge is based on a certain 
percentile of this distribution. In particular, the capital charge 
is based on the 99th percentile loss amount over a ten-day 
future time horizon. This amount represents the maximum 
that the bank could lose over a ten-day period with 99 percent 
probability. Such estimates are often interpreted as measures of 
the degree of risk inherent in a bank’s portfolio, since they 
reflect the portfolio’s potential for future losses.
A regulatory capital requirement for credit risk could be 
based on the output of credit risk models in a similar fashion. 
Just as in the market risk setting, the capital charge could be 
based on a particular percentile of this loss distribution over a 
given time horizon. These parameters would differ from those 
used in the market risk capital framework, for reasons that are 
discussed below. Nonetheless, the basic structure of the 
framework—a capital requirement based on a statistical 
estimate of the distribution of future gains and losses on the 
bank’s positions—could be applied to credit risk exposures.
As in the market risk setting, the IM framework for credit risk 
could have three general components: a set of prudential 
standards defining the risk estimate to be used in the capital 
charge, a set of model standards describing the elements that a 
comprehensive credit risk model would incorporate, and 
validation techniques that could be used by supervisors and banks 
to ensure that model estimates are reasonably accurate and 
comparable across institutions. These three general components 
could be specified in a variety of ways, and the discussion that 
follows generally highlights a range of alternatives. The goal of 
the discussion is to provide a sense of the features that an IM 
approach to regulatory capital would likely incorporate and to 
raise issues requiring further analysis and comments.
Prudential Standards
The first component of an IM regulatory capital regime would 
be a set of prudential standards intended to establish the basic 
degree of stringency of the capital charge. As such, these 
standards would be specified by the supervisor to ensure that 
the regulatory capital requirements provide a suitable degree of 
prudential coverage and would be the same for all banks 
subject to the capital charge. Mirroring the basic elements of 
credit risk measurement models described in the previous 
section, these prudential standards would include the 
definition of loss, the planning horizon, and the target loss 
percentile. Each of these elements is discussed below.
Definition of Loss
As noted, the first step in specifying a credit risk model is to 
determine the definition of loss and the planning horizon. 
Similarly, in constructing a minimum capital requirement 
based on internal models, the first step would be to specify 
supervisory standards for these concepts. In particular, an IM 
approach to regulatory capital would need to specify whether 
the minimum capital requirement would be based on a default 
mode or multistate loss concept and the horizon over which 
these losses would be measured.
Perhaps the most appealing approach 
would be to base an internal-models 
regime on a multistate loss concept, 
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From a prudential perspective, the two standards are linked, 
since there is something of a trade-off between the length of the 
planning horizon and the definition of loss. Specifically, longer 
planning horizons appear appropriate for the default mode 
approach since the impact of defaults that occur beyond the 
end of the planning horizon is ignored. Conversely, somewhat 
shorter planning horizons may be acceptable in a multistate 
paradigm because some of the impact of these long-term 
defaults is captured by credit rating downgrades.
Perhaps the most appealing approach would be to base an 
internal-models regime on a multistate loss concept, because it 
takes account of the probability of changes in credit quality as 
well as the probability of default. This approach is appealing 
because it recognizes economic gains and losses on the credit 
portfolio and, from a supervisory perspective, it holds the 
promise of requiring additional capital for credit weaknesses 
well in advance of their full development as losses. In addition, 
this approach is consistent with the growing tendency of many 
of the largest banking institutions to treat credit risk as 
something that can be traded and hedged in increasingly liquid 
markets. These considerations suggest that a multistate loss 
definition would be the soundest basis for a regulatory capital 
regime based on internal credit risk models.
Nonetheless, this choice would raise some issues that are 
worth noting. The most significant of these is that many models 
currently used by banks incorporate a default mode approach, 
which means that these models would have to be changed—and 
in some cases, entirely reconstructed—to be eligible for 
regulatory capital treatment. In addition, default mode models 
correspond in straightforward ways with the book value 
accounting used by many financial institutions, while multistate 
models are more consistent with market-value accounting. 
Thus, although some evidence suggests that the trend in the 
industry is moving away from default mode models and toward 
multistate approaches, the question remains whether a 
regulatory standard based on a multistate approach would place 
a significant burden on banks or whether it would merely 
provide them with the incentive to move more quickly in the 
direction that they were already going.
Planning Horizon
As indicated above, the choice of a supervisory planning 
horizon is very much linked to the definition of loss. We have 
argued that a multistate loss definition that recognizes changes 
in credit quality short of default would provide the soundest 
basis for an IM capital regime for credit risk. Given this choice, 
we now consider several alternative planning horizons, 
including a fixed horizon of one year, a fixed horizon of more 
than one year, and a “lifetime” horizon that would cover the 
maturity of credits in a bank’s portfolio.
At one end of the spectrum, a lifetime horizon would be 
consistent with the conceptual approach to a traditional 
banking book in which credits are held to maturity.6 By looking 
over the full maturity of positions in the portfolio, the potential 
for all future losses would be captured by the capital 
requirement. In that sense, the lifetime assumption can be 
interpreted as requiring that capital be sufficient to ensure that, 
with a certain probability, the bank will be able to absorb any 
and all losses, even if it is unable to raise additional capital or to 
mitigate its troubled credits.
For this reason, the lifetime horizon would provide a very 
high degree of comfort that capital would be able to withstand 
quite significant negative credit events. However, the lifetime 
horizon approach is at odds with the modeling techniques in 
current use by most practitioners. In addition, the “buy and 
hold” portfolio management assumption might be excessively 
conservative in an environment in which credit risk is 
increasingly liquid. It seems likely, for instance, that even in 
stressful market situations, banks would have some ability to 
manage their loss exposures or to raise additional capital.
An intermediate approach to the loss horizon question 
might be to use a fixed horizon of several years. Since it can take 
two to three years (or longer) to work through the effects of a 
credit cycle, a fixed horizon of more than a year might be 
appropriate from a prudential perspective. However, few 
models currently incorporate a horizon of more than one year, 
so the benefits of increased prudential coverage would have to 
be weighed against the costs of altering the modeling approach 
most commonly used by banks.
For a variety of reasons, a fixed one-year horizon may 
represent the most workable balance between prudential 
concerns and practical considerations about modeling 
practice. As noted above, the multistate setting reflects the 
possibility of defaults beyond one year through credit 
downgrades during the year. Further, a one-year horizon may 
be sufficient for banks and supervisors to begin to respond to 
emerging credit problems. Finally, this horizon is consistent 
with market practice, and is the most commonly used 
approach in the industry. Thus, adopting a one-year horizon 
A fixed one-year horizon may represent 
the most workable balance between 
prudential concerns and practical 
considerations about modeling practice.24 Using Credit Risk Models for Regulatory Capital
for regulatory capital purposes would be least disruptive to 
current modeling practice. This consideration—along with the 
fact that reasonable theoretical arguments can be constructed 
for different holding period assumptions—suggests that a one-
year standard may be the most pragmatic approach.7
Target Loss Percentile
Along with the definition of loss and the planning horizon, the 
target loss percentile is one of the key prudential parameters of 
an internal-models-based regulatory capital regime. As in the 
market risk setting, the capital charge could be calculated based 
on the level of losses at a specified percentile of the loss 
distribution, minus the expected loss.8 The specified percentile 
should be chosen so that, in conjunction with other 
parameters, the capital charge would provide the level of 
prudential coverage desired by the supervisory authorities.9
A number of considerations would apply in determining the 
appropriate target loss percentile. First, since the purpose of 
regulatory capital requirements is to ensure that banks hold 
sufficient capital to withstand significant losses, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the target loss percentile would be 
fairly high. For instance, those banks that use credit risk models 
for internal capital allocation purposes tend to pick target 
insolvency rates consistent with senior debt ratings in the mid- 
to-high investment-grade range. Historical data suggest that 
annual insolvency rates associated with such bonds are less 
than 1 percent, implying a target percentile above the 99th.10 
This example suggests that one approach to determining a 
target percentile is to consider the desired public debt rating for 
large banking institutions.
While safety concerns may suggest setting a very high target 
percentile, other considerations offset this incentive to some 
degree. First, the capital guidelines are meant to be minimum 
regulatory standards, and banks would almost certainly be 
expected to hold actual capital amounts higher than these 
minimums.11 If this is the case, then it would be desirable to 
establish regulatory minimum capital requirements that are 
lower than the internal capital amounts that safe and prudent 
banks choose to hold.12 This consideration suggests selecting a 
somewhat lower percentile of the distribution, perhaps one 
associated with the minimum public debt rating consistent 
with a bank’s operating in a safe and sound manner.
There may also be practical reasons to consider selecting a 
somewhat lower target percentile. Foremost among these are 
validation issues. Since we observe losses associated with these 
high percentiles very infrequently, selecting a very high percentile 
as the supervisory standard may exacerbate the already difficult 
task of model validation. One possibility might be to base the 
regulatory capital requirement on a less extreme value of the 
PDF—for instance, the 90th percentile—that could be validated 
more easily and to adjust this figure upward if there is concern 
about whether the resulting capital charge was stringent enough. 
While this approach has certain intuitive appeal, establishing a 
scaling factor that would accurately translate a lower percentile 
loss estimate into the higher percentile desired for prudential 
reasons would require making parametric assumptions about the 
shape of the tail loss distribution. Given the lack of consensus 
among practitioners and researchers on this issue, as well as 
possible variation in the loss distribution across different types of 
credit portfolios, establishing an appropriate scaling factor could 
be a difficult task. In addition, there are important questions 
about whether the ability to validate model estimates would be 
meaningfully improved even using comparatively low percentiles 
of the loss distribution.13
Model Standards
Portfolio credit risk models would have to meet certain 
regulatory standards to be judged by supervisors as sufficiently 
comprehensive to be used for capital calculations. Given the 
current rapid state of evolution of these models, these standards 
should not be highly restrictive. That is, they should not require 
specific mathematical approaches or the use of particular 
“approved” models, since at present there is little basis for 
concluding that one specific approach to credit risk modeling is 
uniformly better than all others in all situations. Such 
requirements either would impede future modeling advances or 
would require frequent revision of regulatory standards to 
encompass innovations and advances in modeling.
As an alternative to a regulatory framework based on 
specific modeling restrictions, conceptual standards could be 
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developed that would require banks subject to an internal-
models capital requirement to develop and use a comprehensive 
credit risk model. Flexibility could be permitted in how the 
concepts are incorporated within any given model, subject to a 
supervisory review and approval process to ensure that the model 
was sufficiently comprehensive. Supervisors could work with the 
industry to develop sound-practice guidance, which could be used 
when assessing banks’ models to make certain that models and 
assumptions fall within an acceptable range. This approach might 
result in a degree of disparity across banks; however, some 
disparities may be desirable if they reflect legitimate differences in 
how individual banks choose to model the risk factors that are 
most important to their business mix.14 As long as banking 
supervisors can verify that a bank’s choices are reasonable and that 
model parameters have a sound empirical basis, conceptual 
standards could strike a balance between ensuring comparability, 
on the one hand, and facilitating continued model improvement 
and innovation, on the other.
The rest of this section considers how modeling standards 
might address the conceptual elements that characterize 
comprehensive portfolio credit models as outlined earlier. The 
discussion covers the key elements of robust credit risk modeling 
to indicate a potential starting point for regulatory modeling 
standards. Conceptual standards for comprehensive models 
would have to cover two major areas: model structure and general 
data requirements related to parameter estimation and to the way 
in which portfolio structure is captured within the model.
Standards for Model Structure
Comprehensive credit risk models account for variation in and 
correlation between losses from individual credits, borrowers, 
or counterparties. This can be accomplished in a variety of 
ways, but in general terms it entails accounting for variation 
due to three key modeling elements: transition probabilities, 
credit exposures, and asset revaluation. Structural modeling 
standards would have to address all three areas.
Transition probabilities: In one way or another, 
comprehensive models incorporate the probability that any 
given position might have migrated to a different credit quality 
state at the planning horizon. In a default mode framework, 
this requires an assessment of the probability of default, while 
in a multistate framework, the model must capture the 
probabilities of credits moving from one credit state or risk 
category to any of the others. At a minimum, standards would 
require that models used for regulatory capital do this.
However, transitions between credit quality states are 
correlated to some extent across borrowers. Structural 
modeling standards would have to address the extent to which 
models should recognize this fact. A requirement that models 
incorporate this type of correlation should not pose a 
significant hurdle for most banks, because few if any models 
assume that variation in credit quality is independent across 
borrowers. This is hardly surprising, since a model that made 
such an assumption would fail to capture one of the most 
important influences on risk in a credit portfolio. A standard 
probably would also require that the relevant correlations be 
based on empirical analysis, although in some cases a more 
judgmental process might be warranted.
Credit exposures: Uncertainty in credit exposures at the 
horizon may stem from direct dependence on market prices or 
rates, such as counterparty credit risk exposures under 
derivatives contracts. It also may arise for other reasons, as in 
the case of lines of credit and standby letters of credit that 
depend on actions of borrowers that are generally beyond a 
bank’s control. Because the size of credit exposures has a first-
order effect on measured credit risk—for example, a 20 percent 
increase in exposure generally leads to a 20 percent increase in 
the risk estimate—standards for comprehensive models would 
have to specify an approach to recognizing this uncertainty.
At a minimum, a regulatory standard could require models 
to recognize that exposures can change, perhaps by making 
“stress case” assumptions about exposures at the end of the 
planning horizon. An example of such an approach would be 
to assume that all credit lines will be completely drawn down, 
or that derivatives will have exposures equal to some high 
percentile of their potential future values. In the near term, a 
realistic and adequate regulatory standard might simply 
require that models incorporate deterministic changes in 
exposures according to credit quality states, but a more 
complete alternative would be to incorporate an element of 
random variation in exposures.15
For positions that involve derivatives or that otherwise 
depend to a material extent on market factors, standards likely 
would require integrated models of market movements and 
credit exposures. Especially in such cases, banks’ credit risk 
Comprehensive credit risk models
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models should reflect not only the uncertainty in future 
exposures, but also the potential correlation of exposures 
across credits. For example, a bank’s counterparty exposures 
from derivatives contracts that are linked to a common market 
price will certainly be correlated, and this correlation should be 
captured in exposure estimates. This is an area in which 
modeling practice is developing rapidly, and fairly rigorous 
regulatory standards likely would be appropriate.
Asset revaluation: An integral part of any credit risk model is 
revaluing various credit exposures as they migrate across credit 
quality states. As noted in the prior section, in multistate models 
this process of asset valuation consists of revaluing positions 
according to their credit quality and the general market conditions 
expected at the end of the planning horizon, generally by using 
market credit spreads to discount contractual payments.
Standards for comprehensive models should require banks 
to capture not only the expected change in value as positions 
migrate across credit quality states, but also the impact of the 
uncertainty around these changes. Thus, using a market-based 
but fixed-term structure of credit spreads would be inadequate. 
Incorporating deterministic changes in credit spreads, perhaps 
based on the forward spreads implied in the yield curve, is 
more sophisticated but still does not capture the effects of 
uncertainty. Thus, modeling standards might require that 
volatility in market credit spreads and correlations between 
changes in these spreads be explicitly incorporated into 
revaluations due to migration across credit quality states.
Default states often are treated separately, with revaluation 
based on the fraction of the exposure that ultimately will be 
recovered. Recovery rates vary by facility type, across industries, 
and across countries. However, they also vary uncertainly with 
conditions in asset markets, and standards for comprehensive 
models probably would require banks to incorporate this source 
of uncertainty.16 An important question in setting model 
standards is whether models should be required to capture 
correlations among recovery rates in addition to variation, and, if 
so, what sort of standards can reasonably be established to ensure 
that these correlations are adequately captured.
Other aspects of correlation: As noted above, cross-credit 
correlations are important within each of the three dimensions 
of transition probabilities, exposures, and revaluation. 
However, there can also be important correlations across these 
dimensions. For example, the same factors that cause a 
borrower to transition to an inferior credit quality state might 
also cause an increase in the draw on a line of credit and a 
simultaneous decline in the value of collateral assets. In that 
case, all three dimensions of credit uncertainty are correlated.
Capturing these types of correlations is an area in which credit 
risk models have made limited progress. To date, most credit risk 
models assume that most of these correlations are zero. Model 
developers sometimes assert that such assumptions are 
appropriate because the correlations either are relatively 
unimportant or are impractical to model. Further exploration of 
such assertions would be necessary to ensure that these 
assumptions are reasonable. Standards for comprehensive models 
could require banks to either estimate and incorporate the relevant 
correlations or demonstrate convincingly that they are not 
material. This would likely present a significant hurdle, given the 
current state of model development.
Thus far, this section has outlined a qualitative standard 
requiring a model to capture correlations both within and 
across each of the three dimensions of transition probabilities, 
exposures, and revaluation. As noted earlier, nearly all models 
assume that these correlations are driven by one or more risk 
factors that represent various influences on the credit quality of 
the borrower. The assumptions about the statistical process 
driving these risk factors determine the overall mathematical 
structure of the model and the ultimate shape of the PDF. As 
such, a comprehensive models standard would need to address 
the underlying distribution of these risk factors.
Although it might be desirable to develop a specific standard 
for the distribution of the risk factors, differences in model 
structure again make it difficult to establish minimum 
requirements that would be broadly applicable. Given the 
importance of these embedded assumptions, the development 
of such standards may be one of the most important hurdles 
that banks and supervisors will need to clear before an IM 
approach for credit risk could be implemented. At a minimum, 
as an alternative, supervisors would need to address the 
calibration and statistical process driving these risk factors in 
sound-practice guidance.
Standards for Data and Estimation
Data requirements may pose some of the most significant 
implementation hurdles for an IM capital adequacy regime.17 
A comprehensive credit risk model must 
be based on a rating process that is sound 
and rigorous and that incorporates all 
relevant information, both public and 
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Two major categories of data are required for models-based 
capital calculations. First, the credit portfolio must be 
characterized in some consistent way, appropriate to the model 
being used. That is, the portfolio structure must be captured. 
Second, any model relies on certain parameter estimates, 
typically computed from empirical observations, 
corresponding to the conceptual dimensions described above. 
These parameter estimates tailor the more general conceptual 
model of credit risk to the specific operating environment of a 
bank. This section discusses some general issues related to data, 
for both portfolio structure and parameter estimation, and the 
types of regulatory standards that might be appropriate for this 
aspect of credit risk modeling.
Portfolio structure: In a comprehensive credit risk model, 
the two most important aspects related to portfolio structure 
are that the portfolio be appropriately segregated by credit 
quality and that all material exposures be accounted for. The 
nearly universal approach within the industry for 
characterizing credit quality is to assign each exposure a 
numerical rating along a continuum of risk grades that divides 
the exposures into various categories according to credit risk. A 
number of different approaches are used in practice, based on 
some combination of external agency ratings, market and 
financial statement data, and other information. In marked 
contrast to market risk models, banks use internal analysis and 
private, proprietary information on relevant borrower and 
counterparty characteristics to determine how exposures are 
included in credit risk models. Sound practices in the area of 
internal credit risk rating have been evolving rapidly. Whatever 
approach a bank uses, the overall quality of the credit risk 
modeling effort depends heavily on the quality of the rating 
process. Thus, a comprehensive credit risk model must be 
based on a rating process that is sound and rigorous and that 
incorporates all relevant information, both public and 
proprietary. Standards in this area are the subject of ongoing 
efforts by regulatory and industry groups.
Aside from being based on a rigorous credit rating system, a 
comprehensive credit risk model must capture all material 
credit exposures and incorporate them appropriately in the 
calculations. This process would start with identifying which 
positions within a bank’s portfolio were subject to the credit 
risk capital charges. The current regulatory capital structure 
separates positions into those subject to market risk capital 
standards and those subject to credit risk standards, primarily 
on the basis of whether a position is held inside or outside of a 
bank’s trading account. Thus, a clear delineation between the 
banking and trading books would be necessary to prevent 
“regulatory arbitrage” intended to minimize regulatory capital 
requirements by inappropriately shifting positions across 
books. Of course, such incentives exist even in the absence of an 
IM approach to credit risk, and supervisors have developed 
guidance to govern the treatment of various types of positions. 
To the extent that the incentives to engage in such regulatory 
arbitrage are heightened under an IM regime, supervisors 
could refine this guidance to ensure that it limits the 
opportunity for banks to shift positions solely to benefit from 
reduced capital requirements.
Once the positions subject to the credit risk capital 
requirements have been identified, regulatory standards would 
require institutions to demonstrate that their information 
systems consolidate credit exposure data globally, with any 
omissions immaterial to the overall credit risk profile of the 
institution. For completeness, the structural data would have to 
capture the flow of new credits into each rating category, the 
elimination of any retiring credits, and the migration of existing 
credits into other rating categories. That is, initial ratings should 
be updated periodically to reflect the current financial condition 
of borrowers or counterparties. In addition, the model should 
aggregate all material exposures for each borrower, so that a 
consolidated exposure estimate is produced.
Parameter estimates: Parameter estimation gives rise to some 
of the most significant data issues in constructing a 
comprehensive credit risk model. Estimation techniques often 
are unique to a particular model, so again the standards must 
be conceptual rather than specific. However, banks would be 
expected to explain and justify estimation methods to bank 
supervisors and to provide sufficient support—such as 
literature citations, technical documents, and access to 
developers—to make possible a rigorous assessment of the 
parameter estimation methodology.
Data sources vary by type of parameter. Data on transition 
probabilities may come from a bank’s own credit migration 
experience. In contrast, parameters that reflect state values 
and their variations generally are based on market credit 
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spread data, estimated from historically realized values on 
asset sales for certain types of assets, or based on recovery 
rates for assets in default. Whatever the specific data used to 
calibrate the parameters, regulatory standards likely would 
reflect three general principles. First, the data should be 
drawn from a historical period that reflects a wide range of 
potential variation in factors related to credit quality, thereby 
providing adequate historical coverage. Second, the data 
should be applicable to the specific business mix of the bank. 
Third, the data should reflect consistent definitions of default 
or of relevant credit-state transitions.
With regard to historical coverage, a comprehensive 
approach would require that the data, in combination with 
the model structure, be sufficient to reflect credit cycle effects. 
To achieve that, regulatory standards likely would require a 
historical window that encompasses a period sufficiently long 
to capture defaults and downgrades that were at various times 
both high and low by historical standards. Specific 
requirements may vary depending on the asset type, 
geographic region, or product market in question, since 
different products and markets experience cycles at different 
times and with different frequencies, but an adequate window 
would almost always span many years.
With regard to bank-specific applicability, regulators 
probably would expect a bank to be able to demonstrate that 
the data used to estimate model parameters are appropriate for 
the current composition of its portfolio. For example, data 
from U.S. corporations might not be appropriate for use in 
models that cover exposures to European or Latin American 
borrowers. Similarly, transition probabilities or state-valuation 
estimates based on national level data might be inappropriate 
for institutions with loan portfolios that contain highly specific 
regional or industrial concentrations.
At least in the near term, banks and supervisors are likely to 
face a trade-off between the dual requirements of data 
applicability and coverage of the historical window. Using a 
bank’s own internal data generally solves the applicability 
problem, as long as any significant historical changes in the 
bank’s business profile are addressed and provided the bank 
has experienced a sufficient number of defaults and losses to 
produce reasonably accurate parameter estimates. However, at 
present it appears that few banks can construct an adequate 
data history based on internal data. Alternatively, banks could 
use vendor-provided or public data—for example, data from 
publicly traded bonds—or pooled data from a group of peer 
institutions to estimate parameters. Since historical data of this 
type are more readily available, issues related to sample period 
and coverage of the credit cycle can be addressed more easily, 
but demonstrating that the results are applicable to a specific 
bank’s business mix becomes more difficult.
Finally, parameter estimates should be based on common 
definitions of default or, in a multistate framework, common 
definitions of credit-state transitions. Inconsistency in the data 
used could lead to highly erroneous estimates. It may be 
particularly important to ensure that the data used for default 
probabilities and associated losses-given-default reflect consistent 
definitions. For example, if default probabilities calculated from 
publicly traded bond data were combined with loss-given-default 
figures from internal bank data on nonaccrual loans, the resulting 
estimates of risk could be seriously understated, owing to the 
less severe credit events defined as “default” in the internal 
data. This type of definitional issue also may be especially 
problematic when data are drawn from multiple bankruptcy 
regimes, as is generally the case for international data.
Validation
The third component of an IM capital regime concerns 
supervisory model validation, that is, the process of ensuring that 
the model is implemented in a rigorous way.18 As in the 
discussion of the structure of an IM capital regime for credit risk, 
it is useful to begin this discussion by recalling the validation 
approaches applied in the market risk setting. The market risk 
validation approach relies on a combination of qualitative 
standards and statistical testing. The qualitative standards 
address the internal controls and procedures surrounding the 
design and operation of the models used for regulatory capital 
purposes, focusing on issues such as the need for an independent 
risk management function, regular risk reporting to senior 
management, and periodic independent audits of the model. In 
addition to the qualitative standards, supervisory validation also 
The supervisory validation process can be 
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involves statistical testing of the output of the market risk 
measurement models, or so-called back-testing. Back-testing is a 
way of assessing the accuracy of a model’s estimate of the target 
percentile of the loss distribution—the 99th percentile in the case 
of the market risk capital charge—through a comparison of the 
actual gains and losses on the trading portfolio with the risk 
estimates supplied by the model.
Against this background, the supervisory validation process 
can be viewed as comprising the following two elements. The 
first is the development of sound-practice guidance for the 
structure and implementation of credit risk management 
models. This guidance would consist of a largely qualitative 
description of the current state of the practice in credit risk 
measurement, covering both technical aspects of model design 
and estimation and qualitative standards for the risk 
management environment. The technical aspects of model 
design would cover the elements of a comprehensive credit risk 
model, as indicated above, while the qualitative standards 
would focus on the policies and procedures used by the bank in 
its risk management activities. A key element among these 
policies and procedures would be a “use test” to ensure that any 
model used for regulatory capital purposes is in fact an integral 
part of the bank’s risk management structure.
The second element of the supervisory validation process is 
the use of quantitative testing to detect systematic biases in 
model results. Unlike in the market risk setting, formal back-
testing of credit risk model results is not feasible because of the 
length of a typical credit cycle and the resultant limited number 
of independent observations of actual outcomes.19 As a result, 
model validation in the credit risk setting will likely have to 
draw on a combination of tests, at least until more internal data 
become available and more robust statistical methodologies are 
developed. These tests could consist of both work that banks 
have done internally as part of model design and upkeep (for 
example, sensitivity tests of key parameters) and supervisory 
tests intended to identify systematic differences across banks in 
model outputs (for example, “test portfolio” exercises). Finally, 
public disclosures about model design, estimation, and output 
are another way to bring scrutiny to the models used by banks 
for capital purposes. All of these elements together are intended 
to provide both supervisors and the banks themselves 
assurance that any model used for regulatory capital purposes 
is theoretically sound and properly implemented.
Sound-Practice Guidance
The purpose of sound-practice guidance would be to 
describe in more detail the various elements that supervisors 
would consider when evaluating internal models used for 
regulatory minimum capital calculations. In some cases, 
guidance would describe standards that any model should 
meet to be considered accurate. In other cases, guidance 
would serve to reflect the range of practice found at banks 
with more advanced approaches to modeling. Guidance on 
sound practices would be dynamic and change over time to 
reflect the then-current state of the practice in credit risk 
modeling, providing both supervisors and banks with a 
benchmark against which to assess a particular model’s 
structure and implementation. In particular, since credit 
models will almost inevitably incorporate a certain degree of 
management judgment—for instance, simplifying 
assumptions about correlations or other parameters, the use 
of less-than-perfect data to calibrate model parameters, or 
assumptions about the distribution of aggregate losses—the 
guidance could provide a way of assessing these assumptions 
against the range of current practice.
Within the supervisory process, there is growing emphasis 
on qualitative reviews of banks’ methods for measuring, 
managing, and controlling their risk exposure and the 
implications for capital adequacy.20 A key part of any sound- 
practice guidance would be qualitative standards for the risk 
management environment. Supervisors have developed 
significant experience using qualitative sound practice 
standards to assess banks’ risk management processes in the 
context of market risk. Finally, the upcoming revisions to the 
Basel Accord will likely incorporate a greater reliance on banks’ 
internal risk rating systems in assessing regulatory minimum 
capital requirements. The experience gained by both banks and 
supervisors in implementing the revised Basel Accord has the 
potential to provide important insight into the development of 
qualitative standards and for validation more generally.
Building on the precedent of the market risk amendment to 
the Basel Accord, banks’ use of portfolio credit models for 
regulatory capital purposes would be contingent upon their 
meeting a series of qualitative standards aimed at ensuring that 
The experience gained by both banks and 
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the models used are sound and implemented with integrity. 
Qualitative standards aimed at aligning banks’ risk manage-
ment techniques with supervisory safety and soundness 
objectives could include:
• compliance with a documented set of internal policies, 
controls, and procedures concerning the operation of 
the credit risk measurement system
• an independent risk control unit responsible for the design 
and implementation of the bank’s credit risk model
• a regular independent review of the credit risk model as 
part of the bank’s own internal auditing process, either 
by internal or by external auditors.
Finally, the qualitative guidelines should incorporate a “use 
test” to ensure that any model used for regulatory capital is 
closely integrated with the ongoing credit risk management 
process of the bank. In particular, the model’s output should be 
an integral part of the process of planning, monitoring, and 
controlling the bank’s credit risk profile. For instance, the model 
might be used in conjunction with internal credit exposure 
limits, capital and portfolio allocation decisions, or pricing. All of 
these uses suggest that a bank would have significant incentives 
to invest sufficient resources in model development and 
maintenance to ensure that the model is producing reliable risk 
estimates. Just as in the IM approach for market risk, where a use 
test is one of the key elements of the qualitative guidelines, such 
tests could help to provide discipline in the credit risk setting.
Quantitative Testing
Aside from ensuring that a model meets sound-practice 
standards, supervisory validation could include empirical 
testing of the model’s inputs and results. Given the short-
comings of formal back-testing of model results, quantitative 
testing in the credit risk setting is likely to rest on independent 
review of model parameters such as expected default 
probabilities, loss given default, and exposure estimates; 
sensitivity analysis of key parameter estimates; stress testing of 
model results; and test portfolio exercises intended to identify 
possible systematic biases in model outcomes across banks.21
These elements provide a possible roadmap for 
quantitative testing for model validation, but considerable 
work would be required to implement these ideas in an 
effective way. With the exception of the test portfolio 
exercises, this quantitative testing would most likely build 
on the work done by the banks themselves as part of their 
internal-model development and maintenance procedures. 
That is, the first step in a supervisory review of a bank’s 
credit risk model should be the review of the bank’s own 
work papers documenting the tests done by the model 
builders and by the bank’s internal or external auditors to 
calibrate and test the model.
To support this process, supervisors could develop sound- 
practice guidance on the types of tests that banks would be 
expected to perform as part of developing and maintaining 
their credit risk models. For instance, testing could include 
sensitivity analysis—that is, analysis of the sensitivity of the 
model results to changes in parameters and key assumptions. 
Sensitivity analysis allows management to probe the 
vulnerabilities in a model that arise from its structure, use of a 
particular type of statistical technique, or limitations in terms 
of historical observations. This analysis might include 
demonstrating the impact on the model’s output and resulting 
capital charge from changes in recovery rates, correlations, and 
credit spreads. In all cases, banks would likely be expected to 
maintain adequate documentation to permit a rigorous review 
of model development and testing.
This list is not intended to be exhaustive, because these 
tests would by neccessity be somewhat model-specific. 
However, there are likely to be a general range of parameters 
and assumptions that banks could be expected to examine. 
Where the analysis indicates that particular parameters and 
assumptions have a significant impact on the model results, 
the sensitivity analysis should yield a thorough understanding 
of the impact of changes.
Another important benchmark against which supervisors can 
assess the reasonableness of a bank’s modeled capital 
requirement is stress testing. Stress testing is an important 
element of the modeling and risk management process that can 
help ensure that potentially large portfolio losses are not hidden 
by overly optimistic or simplistic assumptions. While stress 
testing is far from a perfect validation tool, it can provide 
important information about the impact of unlikely but 
potentially damaging events that could result in very large losses 
in a bank’s credit portfolio.
The key, of course, is identifying a meaningful range of stress 
scenarios and accurately assessing their likely impact on the 
While stress testing is far from a perfect 
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credit portfolio.22 These stress scenarios could involve actual 
historical events; simulated increases or decreases in the model’s 
transition probabilities, volatilities, or correlations; or a 
widespread deterioration in credit quality. As challenging as 
identifying meaningful stress scenarios might be, the lack of 
historical data and the inability to back-test model results make 
stress testing an important and independent indicator 
supervisors can use for gauging the reliability of the modeling 
process and the appropriateness of the resulting capital charge. 
As such, it is an important tool in the arsenal for the evaluation 
of credit risk models.
Beyond the testing done by the bank, supervisors may want 
additional verification that the model output is reasonable. 
However, the absence of back-testing requires that supervisors 
rely on other tools to help them evaluate the output of a bank’s 
credit risk measurement model and to serve as a foundation for 
dialogue and discussion with the bank. Possible tools include 
supervisory stress tests, the use of test portfolios, and 
supervisory use of vendor-provided models.
Public Disclosure of Model Specifications
Another approach to model validation, somewhat different 
from the supervisory processes described above but possibly 
complementary to them, would be to require all banks using 
internal models for regulatory capital purposes to disclose 
publicly full documentation of the model’s mathematical 
structure, key assumptions, and parameter estimates.23 The 
purpose of such disclosure would be to expose the bank’s 
model to the discipline of public scrutiny. This scrutiny could 
aid the supervisory validation process by providing 
independent assessments of a bank’s model by market 
practitioners and interested academics. In addition, it could 
improve modeling practices for the industry as a whole by 
ensuring that the latest modeling innovations were quickly 
disseminated to all practitioners.
While the benefits of such disclosure could be substantial, 
they would depend on the ability of supervisors and banking 
institutions to establish a workable disclosure framework. In 
principle, this could be accomplished through regulatory 
disclosure requirements, though these could be difficult to 
define in view of the wide variety of models and the continuing 
rapid evolution in industry practice. Alternatively, disclosures 
could be assessed through the supervisory review process to 
ensure that key elements of model structure and design were 
being accurately portrayed. The benefits of public disclosure 
would also have to be weighed against their potential costs, 
including the possibility that mandatory disclosure would 
undercut banks’ incentives to develop new and innovative 
modeling practices, since they would have to share the benefits 
of any innovations with their competitors.
Summary and Conclusions
In this article, we have attempted to lay out the issues that would 
have to be addressed in creating a regulatory minimum capital 
requirement based on the output of banks’ internal credit risk 
models. Using the current market risk capital requirements as a 
guide, we identified three basic components of an IM credit risk 
capital charge: prudential standards defining the risk measure to 
be used in the requirement, modeling standards describing the 
essential components of a comprehensive credit risk model, and 
validation standards governing the techniques used by banks and 
by supervisors to ensure that the models are conceptually sound 
and reasonably accurate. An important consideration in 
specifying standards in these three areas would be to balance the 
desire for flexibility and innovation in modeling practice, on the 
one hand, with the need to ensure that the capital charge is 
conceptually sound, empirically accurate, and reasonably 
comparable across banks, on the other.
This article is not intended to be a policy proposal. Instead, 
our goal is to stimulate discussion among financial institutions, 
supervisors, and other interested parties about the many 
practical and conceptual issues that would be involved in 
structuring a workable IM regulatory capital regime for credit 
risk. The Basel Committee is in the process of revising regulatory 
capital standards, and a key factor in considering any IM 
regulatory capital regime will be the experience of both 
supervisors and financial institutions with these new, more risk-
sensitive standards. For these reasons, the discussion above 
should be interpreted as an initial step in trying to establish some 
general principles that could guide the ultimate formation of an 
IM approach to regulatory capital rather than any kind of 
definitive statement of what such an approach would look like.
As our discussion suggests, the challenges in developing an 
IM framework would be significant, both for banks and for 
supervisors. These challenges involve the further technical 
development of the credit risk models used by financial 
institutions, the accumulation of improved data sources for 
model calibration, and the refinement of procedures used by 
banks and supervisors to validate the accuracy of the models’ 
risk estimates. In addition, a variety of detailed implementation 
issues would have to be worked out (see the appendix for a 
discussion of these points). Our hope is that this article will 
represent a constructive step in identifying the most important 
of these many issues and in helping to determine the feasibility 
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A number of issues not discussed in this article would have to 
be addressed before an internal-models-based (IM) approach 
to regulatory capital for credit risk could be implemented. 
These issues include:
• Loan loss reserves and expected loss: A capital charge 
based on unexpected losses raises important issues 
concerning the role and definition of loan loss reserves. 
Recall that unexpected losses equal losses at the target 
percentile minus expected losses. Therefore, if loan loss 
reserves fall short of expected losses, the total resources 
available to absorb losses—reserves plus capital—will 
not be sufficient to provide protection at the desired 
soundness standard. Unfortunately, there is no necessary 
correspondence between the accounting definition of 
loan loss reserves and the concept of expected losses 
from a credit risk measurement model. Thus, over the 
longer run, basing a regulatory capital charge on 
unexpected losses may require a rethinking of the 
treatment of loan loss reserves.
• Eligible institutions: The set of institutions subject to an 
IM capital requirement will most likely be defined by the 
minimum standards that are developed. Initially, only a 
small set of banks would likely have models that were 
sufficiently well-developed; many banks currently 
employ default mode models and few, if any, fully 
capture the correlation between risk drivers such as the 
potential correlation between defaults and recovery 
rates. Over time, however, the set of institutions with 
comprehensive credit risk models is likely to grow as 
modeling expertise disseminates through the industry, 
as data sources become more readily available, and as the 
competitive incentives for institutions to manage their 
credit risk exposures in a more active way intensify.
• Scope of application: An important issue is whether an 
IM capital requirement could be designed to cover all of 
a bank’s credit exposures, or only those in selected 
portfolios (for instance, large commercial loans). The 
models discussed in this article are applied primarily to 
commercial lending portfolios, while other portfolios—
such as retail lending—are either covered by models 
whose structures are very different or, occasionally, not 
covered at all. In this situation, it might make sense to 
allow banks to apply an IM capital requirement only to 
those portfolios covered by comprehensive credit risk 
models of the type described here and to use a non-
models-based regulatory capital requirement for other 
portfolios. However, “cherry picking,” or selective 
adoption, is a clear concern if banks are allowed to use 
internal models to determine capital charges for some, 
but not all, of their exposures. That is, a bank may have 
an incentive to model only those portions of its portfolio 
in which capital charges are reduced.
• Scaling factor: The IM capital requirement for market 
risk incorporates a multiplicative scaling factor that is 
intended to translate value-at-risk estimates into an 
appropriate minimum capital requirement, reflecting 
considerations both about the accuracy of a bank’s 
value-at-risk model and about prudent capital coverage. 
There could be a similar role for a scaling factor in an IM 
credit risk capital regime. For instance, given 
shortcomings in data availability, uncertainty 
surrounding the calibration of credit risk model 
parameters (so-called model uncertainty) is a significant 
concern in using these models for regulatory capital 
purposes. More generally, supervisors and banks lack 
long-term experience with credit risk models, a fact that 
creates uncertainty about how the models will perform 
over future credit cycles and during times of financial 
market distress. These concerns could be addressed—
albeit roughly—by scaling up the raw loss figures 
reported by the banks. In this instance, a scaling factor 
might be incorporated when an IM approach is initially 
implemented, and then revisited as both supervisors and 
banks gain experience with the IM regime.
• Frequency of capital calculations: Prudential standards 
would have to specify how frequently banks would be 
required to run their credit risk models and report the 
results to supervisors. Unlike value-at-risk models, 
which are run on a daily basis to assess the market risk in 
banks’ trading activities, credit risk models are run less 
frequently. Monthly runs of the model—where a “run” 
of the model means a new estimate of the PDF of future 
losses incorporating changes in portfolio composition, 
credit ratings, market prices, and parameter updates, 
where warranted—seem a reasonable minimum 
standard in the near term, though over the longer run, 
banks would probably be expected to develop the 
capability to generate fresh model estimates on an even 
more frequent basis (perhaps weekly or biweekly).
Given frequent model results, capital could be based 
on the average of monthly or weekly estimates during the 
quarter. Using an average should mitigate banks’ 
incentives to window dress, as might be the case if the 
capital charge were based on model outputs as of a single 
point in time, such as quarter-end. In addition, averaging 
should smooth short-run volatility in the model 
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estimates and ensure that the capital requirement is not 
overly sensitive to short-term anomalies in credit 
markets.
• Parameter updates: A bank using an internal model for 
credit risk capital would also be required to update the 
model’s inputs and parameters with some minimum 
frequency. There are obvious trade-offs between 
accuracy of risk assessment and reporting burden: more 
frequent updating gives regulators and banks more 
confidence in the model results, but may impose a 
greater burden on the banks. Different updating 
schedules may be reasonable for different types of 
parameters and different data sources. For instance, 
many models use market-based credit spreads to revalue 
credit exposures. These spreads should be updated 
frequently, probably more frequently than the full model 
is reestimated, to account for the potentially significant 
variation of spreads over relatively short periods. In 
contrast, state-value estimates based on recovery rates or 
on market prices from asset sales could be updated less 
frequently, as could transition probabilities and 
correlations, although additional work would be 
desirable to confirm the optimal timing. Portfolio 
structure data should be updated at least as often as the 
material is run.Endnotes
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1. This section draws heavily on a recent Federal Reserve study of the 
structure and implementation of credit risk models at large U.S. 
banking institution (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 1998b). For interested readers, this paper contains an in-depth 
discussion of credit risk modeling issues.
2. A discussion of internal risk rating systems is beyond the scope of 
this article. However, since sound-practice standards and guidelines 
for internal rating systems are under active consideration as part of the 
Basel Committee’s efforts to revise capital standards, regulators’ 
expectations regarding such rating systems will become known as part 
of that process. For further discussion regarding internal rating system 
standards, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(1998a). In addition, for information on the range of internal rating 
practices among international banks, see Treacy and Carey (1998) and 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000).
3. The LGD, sometimes also referred to as the loss in event of default, 
is equal to 1 minus the recovery rate on the defaulted loan.
4. See, for example, Gordy (2000a).
5. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996) and 
Hendricks and Hirtle (1997) for a full description and discussion of 
the market risk capital requirements.
6.  It is interesting to note that under a lifetime horizon, there is no 
distinction between the multistate and default-mode loss definitions 
since credits will either default or mature over their lifetimes; 
intermediate upgrades and downgrades short of default have no 
impact on the value of credits at the horizon.
7.  One concern that arises in specifying a given planning horizon for 
regulatory capital purposes is that this choice may impede supervisors 
from urging banks to use different planning horizons for internal 
purposes if market best practice evolves over time. In the market risk 
setting, this concern is addressed through a simple scaling approach, 
where capital requirements based on a ten-day standard may be 
calculated with scaled risk estimates based on the one-day horizon that 
is typical for most value-at-risk models. However, the nature of the 
processes underlying credit risk is sufficiently different that this 
approach may not be acceptable. For credit risk, it may be more 
appropriate for supervisors to address such issues through the review 
of banks’ internal capital allocation methodologies (see Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System [1999]). Another alternative 
would be to allow each bank to use a bank-specific planning 
horizon—or even a bank-specific loss definition/planning horizon/
target loss percentile combination—but this approach would 
introduce very significant problems in establishing a consistent 
minimum regulatory capital requirement across banks.
8. Subtracting the expected loss from the specified loss percentile 
reflects the concept that capital is used primarily to cover unexpected 
losses. Regulatory standards would have to ensure that expected losses 
were covered in other ways, such as through loan loss reserves or 
through credit spreads on the pricing of credit extensions. See the 
appendix for a more detailed discussion.
9. As an alternative to value at risk, some have suggested that using the 
“expected tail loss”—that is, the expected loss given that the loss is 
greater than the target percentile—as a measure of risk. See, for 
instance, Gordy (2000b).
10. For instance, the historical insolvency rate on AA-rated bonds is 
about 0.03 percent, implying that a target percentile of 99.97 would be 
required to provide that degree of coverage. A 99.97th target percentile 
would mean that unexpected losses would exceed capital only
0.03 percent of the time.
11. See Estrella (1995) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(1999b) for a discussion of the role of minimum capital requirements 
in regulation and supervision.
12. Establishing higher regulatory capital requirements than banks 
themselves would select on safety and soundness grounds would 
imply that supervisors were having an inappropriate impact on banks’ 
business decisions. Under the current capital standard, this 
phenomenon sometimes encourages banks to securitize assets when 
regulatory capital requirements exceed what the market demands.
13. For instance, even using a 90th percentile figure, we would expect 
to see losses exceeding this level only once every ten years. Further, 
validation procedures that examine the entire tail of the distribution—
rather than a single point at a given percentile—may prove more 
powerful in identifying models that fail to capture extreme loss 
behavior. In that event, the ability to validate models would depend 
much less on the particular percentile chosen to form the basis of the 
capital requirement.
14. A study by the Institute of International Finance, Inc., and the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (2000) highlights not 
only some of the differences that can result from banks’ different Endnotes (Continued)
FRBNY Economic Policy Review / March 2001 35
modeling choices, but also differences that arise from the calibration 
and implementation of models that are otherwise similar.
15. Asarnow and Marker (1995) present an empirical study of the 
relationship between the use of lines of credit in the event of default 
and borrower credit quality.
16. Frye (2000) highlights the challenges and potential importance of 
incorporating recovery rate uncertainty.
17. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999a) for a full 
discussion of these hurdles.
18. This section focuses on validation of portfolio credit models. 
Critical validation issues also arise with regard to the mappings of 
individual credits into a given institution’s internal credit grades. As 
indicated above, both banks and supervisors have been devoting 
significant attention to this process in recent years, and considerable 
progress has been made in addressing some of the key issues. See, for 
instance, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2000) and Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1998a).
19. Lopez and Saidenberg (2000) discuss some of the challenges and 
limitations of back-testing credit risk models.
20. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999) for a 
discussion of banks’ internal capital allocation procedures and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1999b) for a discussion of 
internal capital as “pillar two” of the proposed revisions to the Basel 
Accord.
21. In a test portfolio exercise, supervisors construct one or more 
standard portfolios, which may be composed of actual or hypothetical 
credit positions, and each bank is asked to produce risk estimates for 
these portfolios using its internal model. The resulting figures are then 
compared across institutions to generate a sense of the range of model 
outcomes and potentially to identify “outliers” whose risk estimates 
fall outside the typical range.
22. Berkowitz (2000) discusses the challenges of establishing a 
comprehensive approach to stress testing.
23. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999b) and Estrella 
(1995), among others, outline the importance of disclosure and 
market discipline as components of banking regulation and 
supervision.References
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